University of Washington School of Law

UW Law Digital Commons
Court Briefs

Faculty Publications

3-27-2007

Brief Amici Curiae of the National Employment
Lawyers Association, the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., and Marianne Sawicki,
in Support of Respondent, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007)
(No. 06-341), 2007 WL 966520
Eric Schnapper
University of Washington School of Law, schnapp@uw.edu

Marissa Tirona
Theodore Shaw

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-court-briefs
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Eric Schnapper, Marissa Tirona, and Theodore Shaw, Brief Amici Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association, the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and Marianne Sawicki, in Support of Respondent, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (No. 06-341), 2007 WL
966520 (2007) https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-court-briefs/9

This Court Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.

No. 06-341

9MPANY OF LOS ANGELES,
Petitioner,
v.

Respondent.
tates
Tenth Circuit

IN
ERIC

SCHNAPPER

Counsel of Record
School of Law
UniVersity of Washington
P.O. Box 353020
Seattle, WA98195

THEODORE

SHAW

Director-Counsel
JACQUELINE

A.

BERRIEN

NORMAN
J. CHACHKIN
ROBERTH. STROUP
MELISSA

S.

WOODS
DEFENSE AND
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

NAACPLEGAL

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600
New York, ~ 10013-2897
(222) 965-2200
Counsel for Amici
COCKLELAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT(402) 342~2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTEREST
OFAMICI
..............................................

1

SUMMARY
OFARGUMENT
....................................

2

I.

UNDER AGENCY PRINCIPLES EMPLOYERS
ARE
LIABLE
FOR THE
CONDUCT
OF
EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE
OF
4
THEIR
AUTHORITY
.....................................

II,

EMPLOYER LIABILITY IS NOT LIMITED
TO THE ACTIONS OF THE LAST AGENT
INVOLVED IN A CHAIN OF DECISION13
MAKING
........................................................

III,

AN EMPLOYER IS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY THE
DISCRIMINATORY
CONDUCT OF ITS
23
AGENTS
........................................................
30
CONCLUSION
.........................................................

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureauof Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) .......................

5

Burlington Industries
v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742
(1998)......................................................................

passim

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,Inc., 467U.S. 837(1984)..................................

6

Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
(1980)
.........................................................................

8, 24

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998)............................................................

4, 6, 7, 15,

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354
F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed, 543 U.S.
1132(2005)................................................................
2, 22
Karibian v. Columbia University,
14 F.3d 773 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213(1994).........................

4

Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989)
........................................................................
19, 21
Martin v. Mecklenburg County, 151 Fed. Appx. 275
(4thCir.2005)...............................................................

14

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986)
..................................................................
2, 4, 5, 19
Meyerv. Holley, 537 U.S. 250 (2003)..................................

4

Price Waterhousev. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) .............

8

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
U.S.131(2000)...........................................

Inc.,

530
3, 7, 19, 25,

Sawicki v. Morgan State University, et al., No. 06603.............................................................................

1, 23

ooo

lll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Shager v. Up john Co., 913 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 1990) .......

4, 8

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) .......

24

STATUTES:

42U.S.C.§ 706(g)(2)(B)
....................................................

25

RULES:
Supreme
CourtRule37.3 ...................................................

1

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

2 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The Law of Torts
24(2ded. 1956)...............................................................

5

5 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The Law of Torts,
§ 26.3,p. 15 (2ded. 1986)..............................................

12

Restatement(Second)of Agency,§ 219(2)(a) ......................

9

Restatement(Second)of Agency,§ 219(2)(d) ......................

5

Restatement(Third) of Agency,§7.07.............................
Restatement(Third) of Agency§ 7.08 ................................
W. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of Agency, 141
(1984)
.............................................................................

5, 6
6
12

1
INTEREST OF 1AMICI
The National
Employment Lawyers Association
("NELA’) is the only professional
membership organization in the country comprised of lawyers who represent
employees in labor, employment and civil rights disputes.
NELAand its 67 state and local affiliates
have a membership of over 3,000 attorneys who are committed to working
on behalf of those who have been illegally
treated in the
workplace. NELAstrives to protect the rights of its members’ clients,
and regularly supports precedent-setting
litigation affecting the rights of individuals in the workplace. NELAadvocates for employee rights and workplace
fairness while promoting the highest standards of professionalism, ethics and judicial integrity.
The NAACPLegal Defense and Educational
Fund,
Inc. ("LDF") is a non-profit corporation established under
the laws of the State of New York, formed to redress
injustice
caused by racial discrimination
and to assist
African-Americans in securing their constitutional
and
statutory rights. For over six decades, LDFattorneys have
represented parties in litigation
before this Court and
other federal courts on matters of race discrimination in
general, and employment discrimination in particular.
Marianne Sawicki is the petitioner
in Sawicki v.
Morgan State University, et al., No. 06-603, now pending
before this Court. The question presented in Sawicki is
essentially
the same as the question presented in the
1 Counselfor amici authoredthis brief in its entirety. Nopersonor
entity other than amici, their staff, or their counsel madea monetary
contribution to the preparation or submissionof this brief. Letters of
consentto the filing of this brief havebeenfiled with the Clerk of the
Court pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 37.3.

instant case. Ms. Sawicki’s Title VII claim was dismissed
by the lower courts applying the ultimate decisionmaker
standard adopted for the Fourth Circuit in Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir.
2004) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 543 U.S. 1132 (2005).
Petitioner in the instant case is urging this Court to adopt
the rule in Hill.
SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT

The employer in this case, as commonly occurs, took
certain personnel actions as the result of a "chain of
decision_making" (Pet. Br. 44). In that decisionmaking
process several BCI officials played distinct roles and were
allocated responsibility
for making different
types of
decisions.
Whether an employee who plays a role in a decisionmaking process acts as an agent of the employer is governed by traditional
agency law principles.
The conduct of
an official is properly imputed to his or her employer when
the official "exercises the authority actually delegated to
him by his employer."
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70 (1986). Grado was doing precisely
that when he carried out the established responsibility of a
BCI supervisor to select which potential
disciplinary
matters to raise with the human resources department,
and when he "presented the facts" to that department.
Employer liability
is not limited to the conduct of the
last decisionmaker in a chain of decisionmaking, the socalled "ultimate decisionmaker." In the case of a termination, that last decisionmaker - in this case the one who
selected termination as the sanction - is not the only, or
necessarily
the most important, decisionmaking agent.
"Agency principles [impose] vicarious liability
for harm
caused by misuse of supervisory authority."
Burlington

Industries
v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). That
principle is equally applicable regardless of when in the
decisionmaking process the misuse of authority occurs.
The far different
"ultimate
decisionmaker"
standard
proposed by petitioner,
and adopted by the Fourth Circuit,
has - as a district judge in that circuit recently observed "the unfortunate potential
to create a safe harbor for
workplace discrimination."
A plaintiff
must demonstrate
that an improperly
motivated official,
acting as an agent of his or her employer, took some act that caused the dismissal or other
injury complained of. That improperly motivated act must
be a but-for cause; it must have had "a determinative
influence on the outcome" of the decisionmaking process.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S.
131, 141 (2000).
Neither a showing that the ultimate decisionmaker
made an "independent
judgment" about the facts presented by other officials,
nor evidence that that decisionmaker undertook an "independent investigation"
of the
facts, will necessarily preclude in every case a finding that
the invidiously
motivated act caused the injury complained of. The exculpatory
evidence proffered
by an
employer to show that a disputed adverse action was not
caused by an earlier discriminatory act must specifically
address the particular
type of discriminatory act taken,
and the manner in which that act assertedly
brought
about the adverse action.
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I.

UNDER AGENCY PRINCIPLES
EMPLOYERS
ARE LIABLE FOR THE CONDUCT OF EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR AUTHORITY

This is a case about agency law. "[T]he courts have
consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel." Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986).
"[T]here is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims
against employers for discriminatory actions ... like ...
firing ... have resulted in employer liability
once the
discrimination is shown." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998).
Employer liability
for a discriminatory discharge is an
unremarkable
application
of the established
agency
principle that an employer is liable when its employee
uses, or abuses, his or her authority. "[T]he supervisor acts
within the scope of this authority
when he makes discriminatory decisions in... firing .... "Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 791. "[A] supervisory employee who fires a subordinate
is doing the kind of thing that he is authorized to do, and
the wrongful intent with which he does it does not carry
his behavior so beyond the orbit of his responsibilities
as
to excuse the employer." Shager v. Up john Co., 913 F.3d
398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
That principle is not limited to dismissals or any other
particular type of official act. Regardless of the type of
authority wielded by an official, "[i]t is well established
that traditional vicarious liability rules make principals or
employers vicariously liable for the acts of their agents or
employee in the scope of their authority." Meyer v. Holley,
537 U.S. 250, 285 (2003); see Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir.) (employer liable where

5
supervisor "wields the employer’s authority"), cert. denied,
512 U.S. 1213 (1994); 2 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The
Law of Torts 24 (2d ed. 1956) (employer liable when "the
servant is engaged in performing what he is hired to do").
"[W]here a supervisor exercises the authority actually
delegated to him by his employer, by making decisions...
affecting the employment status of his subordinates, such
actions
are properly
imputed to the employer whose
delegation of authority empowered the supervisor to make
them." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70. ~[T]he employer is vicariously liable for ... company acts that can be performed
only by the exercise of specific authority granted by the
employer." Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
768 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Such authority
power, "once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift
when it is wrongfully
used." Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 392 (1971).
The Restatement of Agency, in its various iterations,
has embraced this rule.
The Second Restatement
of
Agency states that an employer is liable for the torts of an
agent where the agent "was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relation." (Restatement
(Second) of Agency, § 219(2)(d).)
The Third Restatement
provides that an employer is liable for torts committed by
employees "within the scope of employment," and defines
scope of employment to mean "performing work assigned
2by the employer." (Restatement (Third) of Agency, §7.07).

2 The action of an employeewould be part of "an independent
courseof conduct,"and thus outside his or her assignedduties, only if
that conduct"represents a departure from, not an escalation of, conduct
involved in performingassigned work"Section 7.07, comment
b.
(Continuedon followingpage)

Whatever differences
may exist between these two articulations,
they both embrace the rule long applied by this
Court that an employer is liable
for the conduct of its
agent in exercising his or her official
authority.
That rule
encompasses both authority
in the sense of the power to
direct the actions of others (e.g.,
to tell the personnel
department
whether to stop paying a worker) and authority in the sense of delegation of the responsibility
to act in

Petitioner makes muchof the fact that the drafters of the Third
Restatement, writing forty-two years after the adoption of Title VII,
chose to omit the "aided in" language that was contained in the Second
Restatement and that was relied on by this Court in Ellerth and
Faragher. (Pet. Br. 42). This change, however, is expressly limited
the standard of vicarious liability "for a tort committedby an agent in
dealing or communicatingwith a third party." Restatement (Third)
Agency§ 7.08. The commentto section 7.07 explains that the Restatement’s analysis of tort liability to third parties "is inapplicable to an
employer’s liability for one employee’stortious conduct toward a fellow
employee, a topic being considered by the Restatement... Employment
Law, in preparation as the Restatement, Third, Agencywas completed."
To the extent that the drafters of the Third Restatement decided to
omit the "aided in" standard in the Second Restatement, that is of no
significance to the meaning of Title VII. The Second Restatement
described prevailing law when it was adopted in 1958, and remained
unquestioned for four decades after the enactment of Title VII. In
directing that agency principles be applied to determine the scope of
employerliability under Title VII, Congressdid not intend to give to the
membersof the American LawInstitute authority to promulgate, and
change at will, legal standards accorded the great weight of federal
regulations under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The drafters candidly acknowledged
that for years the ~aided in" standard in section 219(2)(d) of the Second
Restatement was ’~idely" construed in a literal manner. Restatement
(Third) of Agency,§ 7.08, Rptrs. Noteb. The fact that the drafters (or,
least, the reporter) of the Third Restatement in 2006 feared that this
widespread view of agency law would unduly expose employers to
vicarious liability does not retroactively change the prevailing agency
law on which Congress relied in enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

the name of the employer (e.g.,
to decide whether to
reimburse an employee for a claimed business expense).
Where a company official,
acting with an unlawful
purpose, uses his or her authority to dismiss an employee
or take some other official action, the courts have held the
employer liable without regard to why the official chose to
discriminate on the basis of race, gender, national origin,
age, disability, or other prohibited characteristic.
Specifically, a plaintiff who has been the victim of a discriminatory official action is not required to prove that the official
involved believed that that discrimination was somehowin
the interests of the employer. Doubtless it is frequently the
case that a biased official believes that employees of a
particular
race, gender, or age are inferior workers, but
proof of such a belief is not necessary to establish employer
liability
for the exercise of official
authority.
Under
Faragher and Ellerth, for example, an employer is strictly
liable if a supervisor dismisses a subordinate because she
spurned his sexual advances, even though the supervisor
in doing so would be acting for "personal motives, motives
unrelated and even antithetical
to the objectives of the
employer." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 776.
The application of this principle is easy in a case in
which a disputed employment action, such as a dismissal,
was solely the result of a single decision. But, except for
very small employers, employment actions are more often
the result of a number of discrete
decisions that may
involve two or more different officials,
each authorized to
play a distinct role. This Court has repeatedly recognized
that employers, rather than leaving decisions (particularly
important decisions such as promotions and dismissals) to
the exercise of ad hoc discretion, frequently utilize instead
some sort of structured "decisionmaking process." Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137, 141
(2000) (plaintiff
dismissed by company president based
recommendations of and information from three supervisors); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236, 248
(1989) (partnership denied by Policy Board after comments
by numerous partners and recommendation by Admissions
Committee); see Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 252 (1980) (tenure denied by Board of Trustees based
recommendation of tenure committee and Faculty Senate).
Petitioner aptly characterizes such processes as involving a
"chain of decisionmaking." (Pet. Br. 44).
Litigation in this Court and the lower courts illustrates the range of distinct decisions that, taken in concert, may lead to the dismissal of an employee:
(1) the adoption of rules regarding employee
conduct, disciplinary
procedures,
and/or
sanctions to be imposed,
(2) the initiation of the disciplinary process,
(3) assembling the body of information on the
basis of which action will be taken,
(4) factual determinations,
(5) determinations
as to whether the facts
found violate the employer’s rules,
(6) recommendations regarding factual deterre:nations, applicability of employer rules, or
the appropriate sanction to be imposed, and
(7) the selection of the sanction to be imposed:
Any of these decisions
can be among "the kind[s] of
thing[s] that [an official] is authorized to do," Shager, 913
F.2d at 405, and a decisionmaking process simply could
not function unless at least most of these responsibilities
were given to some official or officials. Employers are free
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to divide responsibility
for these different decisions be3tween or among any number of officials and employees.
Each of these actions involves a distinct decision; thus
a single employment action (e.g., a dismissal) may involve
several different decisionmakers each dealing with different aspects of the process. Petitioner stresses that Edgar
was "the decisionmaker’; that is correct in the sense that
it was Edgar who made the decision to select dismissal
(rather than, for example, suspension or demotion) as the
sanction to be imposed. But Grado, too, made several key
decisions; for example, it was Grado, and he alone, who
decided to bring this entire matter to the attention of the
Phoenix office - the only office, according to BCI, which
could select dismissal as a decision.
In determining
whether an employer is legally
responsible for a particular decision in a chain of decisionmaking, the usual agency standards apply. For example, if a personnel
recommendation
were made by a
company’s president,
the employer would be legally
responsible, since such a high-ranking official is deemed
an alter ego of the employer. Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 758
(citing Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 219(2)(a)).
making personnel recommendations was among the duties
of a supervisor,
human resources official
or other employee, that employee’s exercise of that authority would be
an act of the employer. Conversely, if an employee who
made an unsolicited
recommendation (that, for example,
a co-worker be fired) had no responsibility
for making
3 BriefAmicus Curiae of the Equal Employment
AdvisoryCouncil,
14 (’~Largeemployersoften delegate initial investigations of workplace
misconductto local humanresources personnel, whoin turn report
their findings to a more senior managerwhomaywork in a different
city or state.F).
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personnel
recommendations,
and did not act for the
purpose (however misguided) of advancing the employer’s
interest,
the employer would not be responsible for that
recommendation or for a possibly invidious motive behind
it. Similarly, an employer which decides not to hire an
applicant
because of the adverse recommendation of a
former employer is not liable (at least absent some form of
negligence on its own part) if that third party’s negative
report was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
In the instant case, a reasonable trier of fact could
certainly conclude that Grado was carrying out his official
duties when he took the actions which led to Peters’
dismissal.
First,
bringing personnel problems to the
attention
of the human resources department was clearly
among Grado’s official duties. As BCI itself stipulated,
"Mr. Grado was responsible for monitoring the employees
working under his supervision,
and when an employee had
an attendance, performance, and/or disciplinary issue, he
was responsible for bringing the issue to the attention of
the BCI Human Resources Department. "~ Second, when a
disciplinary
matter was under consideration
by the BCI
human resources department, it was the responsibility
of
the relevant manager - here Grado - to "present the facts"
to the human resources official.
Pederson explained that
as a human resources official
she would "rely on management to give me th[e] facts ’~ and made decisions based on
4 Memorandum
in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment,"Statementof UndisputedMaterial Facts" (p. 2), p. 4; see
Declarationof Patricia Edgar,par. 2; Declarationof CesarGrado,par. 8,
17; Declarationof Sherry Pederson,par. 2; Pet. Br. 5 ("under BCI’s...
system .... BCI supervisors such as Gradobrought issues regarding
employee
discipline to the attention of Pederson[and] Edgar.").
5 PedersonDeposition,p. 31.
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"the facts presented to me" by the supervisor. ~ Grado
described the role of a supervisor in similar terms. "I
gather the facts and I present them to our HR department
¯.. I will put the facts in front of HR ... I would present
the facts to HR."7 Third, there was substantial
evidence
that it was Grado (not Edgar) who on behalf of BCI made
the critical (and incorrect) decision that Peters was not
actually sick on September 30. 8 Clearly a decision as to
what factual inferences an employer will draw from a body
of information is "an official act of the enterprise, a company act," Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762, requiring the exercise
of delegated authority.
Regardless of whether Grado was biased, BCI objects
that other company officials
made a serious effort to
prevent supervisors
like Grado from engaging in racial
discrimination.
Human resources officials
educated the
workforce about Title VII, circulated anti-discrimination
policies,
and trained personnel such as Edgar to avoid
discrimination. (Pet. Br. 33). But to the extent that Grado
was using his official authority or otherwise carrying out
his official responsibilities,
Grado was as much an agent of
8 PedersonDeclaration,par. 11; see Pet. Br. 15 (Edgaracted on the
basis of "the facts presentedto her.").
GradoDeposition,pp. 31-32.
8 In a letter dated July 12, 2002, to the EEOC,Edgar(writing on
behalf of BCI)stated:
Respondentsattendance policy states that misrepresenting
a reason for absenceis dishonesty and groundsfor immediate termination.Asa result of Mr. Peters’ actions, Mr. Grado
reached the reasonable conclusion that he had simply decided not to workas scheduled.
(Letter of Patricia Edgar ~o Geraldine Herrera, July 12, 2002, p. 2)
(Exhibit B to the EEOC
Responsein Opposition to DefendanfsMotion
for SummaryJudgment).
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BCI as Edgar or the head of the human resources department. Agency law imposes strict liability
on an employer
for the conduct of all of its agents, in part because doing so
creates a greater incentive than the negligence standard
urged by petitioner.
W. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of
9Agency, 141 (1984).
Petitioner
argues that "BCI could not have done
anything more to comply with the statute." (Pet. Br. 14).
But there was, of course, more that Grado could have
done; he could have chosen not to discriminate
on the
basis of race. What petitioner means is that, even if BCI
supervisors or managers engaged in invidious discrimination, there was nothing more that the BCI human resources department could have done to prevent those
violations.
But whether the human resources department
did all it could is beside the point; Title VII applies to all of
BCI’s officials,
not just to its personnel workers. Agency
law imposes on a principal liability for the actions of its
agents because the principal, having retained those agents
to conduct its business and standing to profit from their
activities,
can in return fairly be held responsible for the
injuries inflicted by those agents in the course of their
activities. 1° At BCI profits are generated, not by the human
resources personnel, but by operational
managers like
9 5 F. Harper, F. James& O. Gray,The Lawof Torts, § 26.3, p. 15
(2d ed. 1986)("Pressure of legal liability on the employertherefore
pressure put in the right place to avoid accidents. This reasoninghas
nothingto do with fault. It is true of coursethat liability basedon a
finding of the master’s fault will put pressure on the employerto be
careful. Butthe impositionof strict liability on an employerwill exert
evengreater pressure.... ").
10 W.Seavey, Handbook
of the Lawof Agency,141 (1984); 5 Harper,
James& Gray, supra, § 26.5, p. 17; D. Dobbs,The Lawof Torts, 908
(2OOO).
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Grado, who actually solicit sales and deliver product, or
who supervise those BCI employees who do. Grado is a
profit center; Edgar is just overhead.
Finally, BCI complains that it would be impractical to
oversee the activities,
and detect any misconduct by, its
thousands of employees, scattered
as they are over a
substantial number of states. (Pet. Br. 45). But it is the
very purpose of agency law to impose responsibility
and
liability of that magnitude on principals that decide to hire
a great number of agents in order to engage in a large
commercial or other enterprise.
BCI Coca-Cola is a subsidiary of Coca-Cola Enterprises,
a multi-billion
dollar
corporation with vast assets and operations. The founders
of that enterprise were not obligated to expand in this way,
or to hire countless officials
- like Grado - to staff an
exceptionally successful corporate empire. The successors
of Atlanta pharmacist Dr. John Pemberton, who invented
Coca-Cola and originally
brewed it in a kettle in his
backyard, could have chosen instead only to make and
deliver the beverage themselves; by doing so they could
have avoided any need to supervise far flung subordinates,
and any risk of liability
for misconduct by persons other
than themselves. Neither the owners of the very different
and far more lucrative
enterprise
that emerged, nor
subsidiaries like BCI, can justly complain if the magnitude
of the vast operations that generate great income brings
with it a commensurate degree of legal responsibility
and
potential liability.
II.

EMPLOYER LIABILITY
IS NOT LIMITED TO
THE ACTIONS OF THE LAST AGENT INVOLVED IN A CHAIN OF DECISIONMAKING

Petitioner urges this Court to adopt a novel and quite
extraordinary rule of agency law: when injury is sustained
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as the result of a chain of decisionmaking by company
officials, only the official who madethe last decision is an
agent of the employer. BCI frames this proposed rule
somewhat opaquely, asserting
that solely the "actual,"
"formal," or "true" decisionmaker is the agent of the
employer. (Pet. Br. 20, 23, 47). The Fourth Circuit has
aptly labeled this standard as requiring a discriminatory
purpose on the part of "the ultimate decision_maker."
Martin v. Mecklenburg County, 151 Fed. Appx. 275, 280
(4th Cir. 2005). A chain of decisionmaking usually involves
several decisionmakers.
Petitioner’s
contention is that
where a series of decisions,
by several decisionmakers,
result in the dismissal of an employee, only the last
decision - to impose the sanction of dismissal - is legally
"relevant." (Pet. Br. 15).
When BCI insists
that Grado had no decisionmaking
authority, ’1 it is not denying that Grado had the power to
make and actually made several decisions, e.g., the decision to call Edgar, the decision to provide certain information, the decision to not respond to Katt’s phone calls, etc.
Rather, BCI is asserting that only Edgar, and not Grado,
had the power to make a particular decision, the decision
to select dismissal - rather than, say, a suspension, or
demotion, or a letter of reprimand - as the sanction to be
imposed on Peters. Thus, BCI contends, when an employee
is dismissed, only the official selecting that sanction acts
as an agent of the employer.
There is simply nothing in agency law that supports
this peculiar limitation on who is an agent. Petitioner’s
summary of argument opens with a straightforward
assertion of agency law. "[P]rinciples of agency law.,, look
~1 Pet. Br. 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 28, 40, 43.
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to the employee who has ’principal responsibility’
for the
relevant employment decision. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)." (Pet. Br. 14). But the quoted
phrase "principal
responsibility"
does not appear anywhere in the decision in Ellerth; indeed, this apparently
pivotal quotation never reappears anywhere in petitioner’s
brief at all.
Later, petitioner asserts that
[a]n employer may be liable for the conduct of its
agents acting within the scope of their actual authority, or, specifically, whenan adverse employmentaction is taken by its formal decisionmaker with
discriminatory animus. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790;
RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OFAGENCY,
§§ 2.04, 7.03(2)
(Pet. Br. 19) (Emphasis added). But whether an agent
utilizing his or her authority (as was Grado) emphatically
is not the same thing (petitioner
uses the phrase "or,
specifically"
to suggest an equivalence) as whether an
agent made the "formal" decision (i.e., the last decision, to
impose dismissal as a sanction). (Equating the two standards in this manner is like saying "The permissibility
of
using a designated hitter is governed by the rules for the
American League, or, specifically,
the rules for the National League.") Neither the phrase "formal decisionmaker," nor the proposed equation of these two very
different standards, is anywhere to be found in Faragher
or the cited sections of the Restatement.
Petitioner’s
proposal that only the person who "formal[ly]" takes an employment action is the employer’s
agent would largely override established agency principles. On this view, so long as Edgar selected dismissal as
the sanction to be imposed on Peters, no one else involved
in the decisionmaking
process could be considered an
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agent of BCI. Those other decisionmakers
would not be
acting as BCI agents even if a decision to refer for discipline only blacks who object to Sunday work had been
made by the BCI board of directors,
or if a pretextual
finding that Peters was loafing on September 30 (rather
1~
than actually sick) had been made by BCI’s president.
Under that same approach, BCI would not be liable in tort
if Grado had an accident while driving a delivery truck he
knew had defective brakes, so long as it was Edgar who
made the final decision to permit use of the truck and
Grado had never told Edgar that the brakes did not work.
If this standard were adopted by this Court as a
general rule of agency law, the ramifications would reach
far beyond Title VII. The United States Code is replete
with provisions whose applicability
depends (like certain
Title VII claims) on the existence of a particular intent or
purpose. (Westlaw reports that more than 3,000 federal
provisions use the term "intent.")
Insofar as these laws
apply to corporations, government bodies, or other entities
Petitioner repeatedly argues that it should not be liable for
discriminatoryconductby a "subordinate"official in the decisionmaking
chain. (Pet. Br. 15, 16, 28, 29, 32, 43, 45, 47). But the logic of BCI’s
argumentis fully applicable regardless of whetherthe earlier participants in that chain of events outrankedEdgar.
In this case it is not clear in what sense, if any, Gradowasthe
"subordinate." The record does not suggest that Edgar was Grado’s
supervisor, that she outranked him in some companysystem of job
grades, that she superviseda larger numberof actual subordinates, or
that she was paid morethan he was. This is, rather, a situation in
whichEdgarand Gradohad beengiven different responsibilities within
BCIanddifferent roles to play in a disciplinarymatter.
In the armedforces, the court martial conveningauthority will
Usually outrank the officers, and will always outrank any noncommissioned
officers, whosit on the court martial panel and determineguilt and punishment.
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of any size, their effectiveness and even viability would be
substantially
impaired if the only intent that mattered
was the motive of the employee who made the last, formal
decision in a decisionmaking chain. If, for example, supervisors at a government contractor
prepared lavishly
exaggerated statements of expenses and wrote up charges
for costly but non-existent services, the False Claims Act
would not be violated
so long as the accountant who
finalized and submitted the bill to the United States did
not know what was going on. A wide range of statutes that
govern the rights of corporations
and legal relations
among them - copyright, patent, securities,
anti-trust,
trade and other laws - would be seriously affected. It is
perhaps for that reason that the National Chamber of
Commerce does not endorse the extraordinary
agency rule
proposed by BCI, but insists instead that an employer is
responsible for the misuse of any "delegated authority" by
18
a companyofficial.
In the instant case, BCI contends that Grado accurately reported to Edgar what was occurring in the Albuquerque office. But on petitioner’s
view, it would not have
mattered if Grado was lying through his teeth. BCI insists
that it would not be liable even if what really happened
was that Peters happily agreed to the requests from Katt
and Grado that he work over the weekend, that Peters in
fact put in a full day’s work on Sunday, and that Grado
nonetheless used his official
position to sell Edgar a
completely different story fabricated by Grado because he
believed African-Americans are racially inferior. Similarly,
if Grado acting for such an invidious purpose submitted
18 Brief of the Chamberof Commerceof the United States of
AmericaasAmicusCuriaein Supportof Petitioner, 4, 16, 18, 20, 21.
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time or sales records for Peters that understated the hours
he had worked or the amount of sales for which he had
earned commissions, on petitioner’s
view BCI would not be
liable so long as the officials
in the payroll department
who underpaid Peters did not know that they were receiving inaccurate information.
The sole exception
suggested
by BCI to its proposed
"formal decisionmaker"
rule is an equally strange departure from agency law. An employer
would be legally
responsible
for the motives of any person who had such
"leverage or influence"
that he could "impose his will" on
or "dupe" the formal decisionmaker.
(Pet. Br. 24). 14 Under
BCI’s theory, agency could be established
by showing that
some such other person had an overbearing
personality
(like the influence of the monk Grigori Rasputin over Tsar
14 Petitioner also argues that Edgar was not Grado’s "cat’s paw."
(Pet. Br. 14, 15, 23, 24, 28).
The charmingfable at issue, created in the seventh century B.C. by
the Greek writer Aesop, and put into verse by the seventeenth century
French poet Jean de La Fontaine, has outlived its usefulness as a guide
to the meaningof twenty-first century agency law.
In the Aesop fable, a monkeyand a cat observe chestnuts roasting
on a fire in the homeof their owner. The monkeypersuades the cat to
pull the chestnuts from the fire, promising to share the chestnuts and
flattering the cat with compliments about his feline dexteri~ The cat
(after an independent evaluation of the circumstances) is persuaded
the monkey,and pulls chestnuts from the fire, singeing his paw in the
process. Unfortunately for the cat, he (like Edgar in dealing with
Grado) had misjudged the motives of the monkey. While the cat is
taking the chestnuts from the fire, the monkeyeats them all.
Nothing that occurs in the employmentcontext bears any resemblance to the tactics used by the monkeyin this story. Supervisors do
not persuade personnel officials to fire workers by promising to share
some sort of bonus that the supervisor will receive as a result of the
dismissal; employers do not provide financial rewards for adverse
employmentactions.
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Nicholas II), wove a hypnotic trance (like the evil Svengali
in George Du Maurier’s nineteenth century novel Trilby),
or used trickery to bamboozle the formal decisionmaker
(as did Delilah in persuading Samson to disclose
the
source of his great strength.)
It apparently would not
matter, however, whether this other highly influential
person was not an employee of the defendant. On the other
hand, traditional
agency considerations,
such as delegated
job responsibilities,
the exercise of official power, or an
intent to serve one’s employer, could not be relied on to
show that any other person was acting as an agent.
Unsurprisingly,
BCI does not point to anything in any
version of the Restatement of Agency supporting
such
distinctions.
This proposed limitation
on agency-based liability
cannot be reconciled with the past decisions of this Court.
In both Ellerth and Faragher this Court expressly acknowledged and applied the "agency principle[]
of vicarious liability
for harm caused by misuse of supervisory
authority."
Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added);
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added); see Meritor,
477 U.S. at 70 (employer liable for use of delegated authority "affecting the employment status" of a worker) (emphasis added). Reeves reiterated that a discrimination plaintiff
can prevail
by demonstrating
that an impermissible
consideration "actually played a role in [the employer’s
decisionmaking] process and had a determinative
influence on the outcome." 530 U.S. at 141 (quoting Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (bracketed
material in Reeves)).
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989) illustrates
the principle that employer liability
not limited to situations
in which the person actually

2O
taking the adverse action acted with a discriminatory
purpose. In Lorance the plaintiffs
were demoted in 1982 as
a result of the application of a seniority rule that had been
adopted in 1979. There was no claim that the company
officials
who in 1982 actually ordered the demotion had
themselves acted with an unlawful purpose; the alleged
discriminatory purpose was on the part of earlier company
and union negotiators
who drafted the facially neutral
seniority rule. Under BCrs view of agency law, the benign
purpose of the 1982 demotion decision (taken by the
"formal decisionmaker’) would by itself
have barred any
Title VII claim; the earlier invidiously motivated rule
adoption would have been legally irrelevant.
This Court,
however, agreed that the plaintiffs
would have been
entitled to relief if the invidiously motivated seniority rule
had itself been the subject of a timely Title VII charge. 490
U.S. at 906-13.
Nothing like the rule proposed by petitioner exists in
analogous areas of anti-discrimination
law. If a government employee was targeted for discipline because he was
African-American and found guilty of misconduct because
he was a Baptist, no one would seriously claim that his
dismissal
was nonetheless
constitutional
because the
official who then imposed the sanction of dismissal did not
know what was going on. Similarly,
if a defendant had
been arrested by a biased police officer because he was
Hispanic, indicted by a biased prosecutor because he was
Catholic,
and convicted by a biased jury because his
parents were from Mexico, the defendant’s
resulting
imprisonment would violate equal protection - and could
be successfully challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding regardless of whether the sentencing judge was personally
unaware of those earlier discriminatory acts.
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BCI’s insistence on focusing solely on the last decision
- in a dismissal case the decision to select termination as
the sanction - makes little
practical
sense. In many
situations that "formal decision" may be little more than a
formality. In the instant case, for example, BCI’s human
resources officials insisted that their role was limited to (1)
determining whether the "facts presented" by management constituted
a violation
of some BCI rule, and (2)
determining what sanction was required for that particular violation. 15 BCI argues that the facts presented to
Edgar clearly constituted
flagrant insubordination,
and
that dismissal was the obvious penalty for such insubordination. Once Grado had decided to take the matter up
with the Phoenix office, and "presented" the "facts" regarding the events of September 28-30, the result may well
have been virtually
a foregone conclusion. Similarly, in
Lorance the "formal decisioumakers"
who demoted the
plaintiffs
both properly and predictably applied the relevant rules to the circumstances before them; the critical
decisions had been made by others several years earlier.
The agency rule proposed by BCI permits an employer
to place largely outside the reach of Title VII almost all of
the decisions leading to an adverse employment action.
The employer cotfld generally do so by giving responsibility for the "ultimate," sanction-fLxing decision to an official
who personally has no other role in the decisionmaking
15 Declarationof CesarGrado,par. 6 ("I bring the facts relating to
the matter to the attention of our HumanResources Department.The
HumanResourcesrepresentative then makesthe decision about which
companypolicy or policies applies in the situation, if any, and the
appropriate action to take baseduponwhat has occurred."); Declaration
of SherryPederson,par. 2; PedersonDeposition,pp. 30-31;see Pet. Br. 4
("A HumanResources representative ... determines whether a workplace policyappliesto the situation andordersappropriateaction."),
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process. That was precisely the allocation of decisionmaking roles in the leading Fourth Circuit decision of Hill v.
Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th
Cir. 2004) (en banc). Hil l the onlydecis ion made by th e
"actual decisionmakers"
was to determine the level of
sanction. 16 The National School Boards Association represents that school boards virtually always limit their role in
disciplinary matters to selecting the appropriate sanction
based on the recommendation of and information provided
by school administrators.
The Association insists
that
school boards have no legal responsibility
under Title VII
for any discrimination by those administrators. 17 Absolving
employers in this manner of responsibility
for any and all
discriminatory
actions occurring prior to the "ultimate
decision" will immunize from the prohibitions of Title VII
much, in some instances virtually all, invidiously motivated
conduct. As a district court judge required to administer the
Fourth Circuit’s
~’ultimate decisionmaker" standard recently observed, "[t]he rule has the unfortunate potential to
create a safe harbor for workplace discrimination
by any
16 Theallegedlybiased job site official wasentirely responsiblefor
initiating the disciplinary actions (a flurry of misconductcharges
immediatelyfollowing Hill’s complaintof discrimination), makingthe
relevant factual findings (allegedly knowinglyinaccurate), and determiningthat the facts so foundviolated company
rules. 354 F.3d at 28283 (majorityopinion), 300-01(dissenting opinion).
17 Brief of AmicusCuriae National School BoardsAssociation in
Supportof Petitioner, 4-5:
[M]ostschool boards have no role in evaluating employees,
in investigating employeecomplaints,or in developingrecommendations
for.., discipline, or termination.... [S]chool
boards rely on the recommendations
and input of administrators to informtheir ... decisions .... [A] school board
will only act basedon the facts presentedto it.
(Footnoteomitted).
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prejudiced supervisor who can fairly be described as not
"18
being the final decisionmaker on personnel decisions.
BCI insists
that an employer could not permit the
"formal" decisionmaker to be the "conduit" of the biases of
other officials.
(Pet. Br. 23, 47-48). But a decisionmaking
process in which different decisionmakers are responsible
for distinct decisions is by definition one in which the later
decisionmakers are conduits for the actions and purposes
of those who acted earlier. In this case Edgar worked 470
miles from the Albuquerque office;
she had never met
Peters, did not have a copy of his personnel file,
and
concluded (since it was Grado’s job to "present the facts")
that there was no need to hear Peters’ side of the story or
talk with Peter’s immediate supervisor, Katt. BCI insists
that Edgar was not ’~isolated" from what was really happening; as a practical matter, the "formal" decisionmaker in this
situation would hardly have been more isolated if BCI had
outsourced its personnel decisions to an office in Bangalore.
The problem, however, concerns not isolation but the very
nature of this type of decisionmaking process. Whenever an
employer takes action on the basis of a chain of decisionmaking, the acts of an official whoparticipates at an earlier stage
in the process always have the potential to turn the events
that follow into a conduit for achieving his or her purposes.
III.

AN EMPLOYER IS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR INJURIES
CAUSED BY THE DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT OF ITS AGENTS

Title VII imposes liability on an employer for an adverse
action brought about by the discriminatory conduct of one of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sawickiv. MorganState University, No.06-306,App.20a.
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its

agents. 19 When a biased

supervisor

personally

decides

to fire
a worker,
the causal
connection
between that
decision and the resulting
injury is obvious; the decision
causes injury because it invariably leads other officials
to
take the specific
acts which directly
inflict
harm - the
payroll department stops issuing paychecks and the front
desk or gate no longer permits
the worker to enter the
office or plant. Whenthe alleged discriminatory
official
did
not directly
order the adverse action,
the plaintiff
must
make two specific demonstrations.
First, the plaintiff
must
prove that the biased official
in question took some act
with a discriminatory
purpose. 2° Second, the plaintiff
must
19 In some situations

the discriminatory

conduct that brought

about the injury will itself have occurred so long before that injury that
it lies outside the 180 or 300 day charge filing period. If, as in Delaware
State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), the conduct mandates
particular adverse action, which is postponedfor somespecific period of
time (in Ricks, for a year), the employee mayhave to file a charge
without awaiting that injury. Similarly, if (as in UnitedAir Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)), the discriminatory conduct causes
substantial injury at the time when it occurs (e.g., a discriminatory
layoff), the employeemust file a charge at that point, and cannot do so
for the f~rst time only when subsequent developments give that
discriminatory act additional impact (e.g., a second layoffbecause of the
failure to accrue seniority during the first layoff period).
On the other hand, in somecases the initial discriminatory act may
have little or no practical consequenceat the time, and mayaffect the
employee only because of subsequent developments. For example,
under a progressive discipline system, a worker might receive only a
letter of reprimand for his or her first infraction (an action with no
economic or other consequence), and later be fired because a subsequent infraction was his or her second. If in such a situation a worker is
cited for a first infraction by a discriminatory supervisor, Title VII does
not require the worker to file a charge with EEOC,and ultimately a
lawsuit, to challenge a discriminatory action which as yet has not had,
and might never have, any significant adverse impact.
s0 Under section 703(m) of Title VII, the plaintiff need only prove
that an invidious purpose was Ua motivating factor" behind the act in
(Continued on following page)
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demonstrate
that this improperly
motivated conduct
actually caused the adverse action that injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff must establish but-for causation: if the
improperly motivated conduct had not taken place, the
complained-of-injury would not have occurred.
Resolution of the issue of but-for causation will often
turn largely on the trier of fact’s assessment of the credibility of the officials involved. The respective actions of
those various officials may consist of verbal exchanges (in
this case, a series of telephone calls), and all the relevant
witnesses are likely to be employees of the defendant.
Written allocations of decisionmaking roles may not exist,
and even if extant might not have been followed. In some
instances
causation may depend largely on the thought
process of a particular official; did he or she, for example,
give any weight to the recommendation of another, allegedly biased official? Howeverspecific, consistent, and selfexonerating the testimony of the defendant’s officials,
it
will usually be for the trier of fact to decide, at times based
largely on demeanor and cross-examination,
whether their
testimony is to be believed. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).
The circumstances of this case illustrate
the critical
role of the trier of fact. On the day that Peters was dismissed on October 2, 2001, he was given a written statement signed by Grado and Pederson explaining
the
dismissal was based on his failure to come to work on

question. If the employerdemonstratesthat the discriminatoryofficial
would for other reasons have taken the same act, even absent that
impermissiblemotivatingfactor, the employeris still liable, but the
remediesavailable are substantially limited. 42 U.S.C.§ 706(g)(2)(B).
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September 30. 21 That same explanation
was repeated on
October 16, 2001, in a written statement submitted by
Pederson to the New Mexico Department of Labor. 22 In
November 2001, Edgar wrote to the EEOC offering
a
second, perhaps more persuasive account, stating that
Peters was fired because, having promised to bring Pederson and Grado a note from his physician, Peters failed to
do so. ~s In July, 2002, Edgar gave the EEOCa third,
possibly even more convincing explanation, insisting that
Peters was dismissed because Grado concluded that Peters
had lied to Katt about being sick on Sunday, September
30. ~4 Finally, in February 2004, Edgar signed, in support of
BCrs motion for summary judgment, a statement with yet
a fourth account, explaining that she had fired Peters
because his remarks to Edgar on Friday, September 28
were an act of insubordination.
The 2004 declarations
by
Edgar and Grado regarding their respective roles in the
decisionmaking process are consistent with Edgar’s 2004
account of why Peters was dismissed, but not with Edgar’s
July 2002 explanation,
with Edgar’s November 2001
explanation, with Pederson’s October 2001 explanation, or
~1 Defendant’s Motion for SummaryJudgment, Exhibit B-3. The
notice, evidentlywritten by Grado,stated ’q explainedhow[the order to
workon September30] was a direct order and failure to complywith
the directive wouldbe considered insubordination .... You did not
report on Sunday9-30-01, and therefore your employmentis being
terminatedfor insubordination."
Plaintiff EEOC’s
Responsein Oppositionto Defendant’sMotion
for Summary
Judgement,Exhibit I ("[Peters] was told by Cesar Grado
that if he didn’t showup, it wouldbe consideredinsubordination.").
Id., Exhibit J (’2~r. Peters told Mr. Grado and the local HR
Administrator, Sherry Perderson, in a meetingthat he had a doctor’s
note, but he did not provideone.").
Seen.8, supra.
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with the explanation
set forth in the dismissal
signed in October 2001 by Grado and Pederson.

statement

BCI’s summary judgment motion relied
heavily on the
type of interested,
unverifiable
testimony which the trier
of fact, although permitted to accept, is not required to
believe. In declarations
filed some three years after Peters
was dismissed,
Edgar and Grado provided (largely
for the
first time) pointedly detailed descriptions
of exactly what
they had said to one another in private telephone conversations on September 28 and October 1, 2001. 25 Edgar and
Grado also swore to highly
nuanced accounts
of their
2e BCI
respective
motives in each of those conversations.
repeatedly insists
that all this self-exonerating
testimony
was "undisputed." (Pet. Br. 11, 15, 37, 39). It is, of course,
true that no one but Edgar and Grado was on the phone
during the critical
conversations,
and that only Edgar and
Grado, respectively,
had personal
knowledge of what was
25 According to those accounts, Grado offered no recommendations,
made no requests regarding how Peters was to be dealt with, never
disparaged Peters, only asked Edgar for help in solving his staffing
problem, and did not "confer" with Edgar about whether or how Peters
should be disciplined. (Pet. Br. 8, 9 n.4, 25). For her part, Edgar
assertedly never asked Grado’s views about the matter, and carefully
instructed Gradoto find out if Peters had called in to Katt about being
absent on September30. (Pet. Br. 9, 25).
~ Grado insisted that whenhe first called Edgar his sole purpose
was to seek advice about his authority to order Peters to work on his
day off, that he never envisioned or intended that the call wouldlead to
any disciplinary action (Pet. Br. 37, 39, 49), and that at no point in any
of the conversations did he intend to influence what Edgar would
decide. (Pet. Br. 24). Edgar recalled with equal clarity that it was she
whoconcluded, from the fact that Peters had called Katt rather than
Grado, that Peters was not really sick (Pet. Br. 11, 25-26; but see n.8,
supra), and that she decided to fire Peters because of insubordinate
remarks on Friday, September28, not because he failed to go to work on
Sunday, September30. (Pet. Br. 26 n.9, 27 n.10).
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on her or his mind during those critical
days. But that
circumstance does not provide the solution to this controversy; rather, it frames the very problem that the trier of
fact must resolve. Were such self-serving statements about
matters known directly only to the defendant’s own employees deemed conclusive, few Title VII claims would ever
survive to trial. Reeves makes clear that it is ordinarily for
the trier of fact to decide whether such accounts are
reliable and credible, or are merely clever after-the-fact
explanations
contrived to explain why a worker who had
permission from his supervisor not to work on Sunday,
September 30, and who was in fact sick on that day, was
nonetheless later told that he was being fired for not
working on September 30.
BCI contends that, regardless
of the nature of a
discriminatory official
act or the way in which it might
tend to lead to an adverse action, there is one method by
which an employer always can prove that that discriminatory act did not cause any subsequent adverse action; the
employer need only demonstrate that the final decisionmaker made an "independent
evaluation"
of the facts.
(Pet. Br. 48). The Tenth Circuit took a different approach,
holding that an employer always can prove that an alleged
discriminatory
act did not cause a subsequent adverse
action by demonstrating
that the final decisionmaker
made an "independent investigation"
of the relevant facts.
(Pet. App. 21a). Neither of these proposed per se rules
adequately takes into account the wide variety of ways in
which such a discriminatory
act would lead to the dismissal of, or some other adverse action against, an employee.
There are, to be sure, situations
in which a finding
that the final decisioumaker made such an independent
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evaluation would demonstrate the lack of the requisite
causation. If the sole alleged discriminatory
act was a
biased recommendation that an employee be dismissed, an
employer would prevail if the trier of fact concluded that
the ultimate decisionmaker had expressly disregarded any
recommendations, and had made an independent, de novo
evaluation of the evidence and appropriate sanction. But
such an independent evaluation would be entirely ineffective in breaking the causal connection if the discriminatory action at issue consisted of providing the final
decisionmaker with false inculpatory evidence. (Regardless of whether a jury independently evaluates the evidence before it, a conviction would not be valid if the
defendant was arrested, searched and prosecuted because
of his race, or if the prosecutor knowingly introduced
highly inculpatory perjured testimony.)
Similarly, an independent investigation
would break
the causal connection if the discriminatory act was providing inaccurate information, and that independent investigation led the ultimate decisionmaker to disregard that
misinformation, and to base an adverse decision on other,
untainted evidence. But such an independent investigation would be beside the point if the discriminatory
act
was not providing false information but making a biased
recommendation (e.g.,
to fire rather than merely reprimand the worker), and the ultimate decisionmaker - after
personally looking into the facts - gave dispositive weight
to that tainted recommendation.
In all cases, exculpatory evidence proffered by an
employer to show that the adverse action was not caused
by an earlier discriminatory act must specifically
address
the particular type of discriminatory act alleged, and the

3O
manner in which that act assertedly
disputed adverse action.

brought about the

Where an employer confers upon a given official
the
authority to take a significant step in the disciplinary (or
other decisional) process, and the official uses that authority to take a discriminatory act likely to cause injury, it
will not invariably be the case that a second official - at a
later point in the process - will be able to remove the
resulting
taint of the decisionmaking process. In the
instant case, for example, the government contends that
Grado engaged in race-based selective reporting, notifying
Edgar that Peters had refused to work on a weekend, even
though Grado would not have so reported
a white or
Hispanic worker who had done the same thing. If such
selective reporting indeed occurred, nothing thereafter
done by some other BCI official could eliminate the but-for
causation;
if Peters had been white or Hispanic, Edgar
would not have been called, Grado would not have issued
an ultimatum, Pederson would never have been asked to
pull Peters’ old file, and no one would have questioned
Peters’ bona tides when he called in sick. BCI, having
opted to give Grado control over whether to take the steps
that would trigger a disciplinary process, cannot complain
if as a practical matter no other official was thereafter in a
position to undo the resulting impact of that biased act on
the decisionmaking
process.
Under Title VII, unlike
friendly games of golf, there are no mulligans.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons,
appeals should be affixmed.
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